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Periodically, the tensions and contradictions
emanating from the big, marvelously 
innovative, highly inequitable, and hugely
expensive U.S. health care system force a
general reassessment of the way this 
country finances and delivers health care for
its citizens. One of these periods appears to
be approaching—although, as Ted Marmor
pointed out over a decade ago, coalitions
preferring the status quo almost always 
prevent these reassessments from resulting
in more than incremental change.
1 Today,
over 46 million people are uninsured, 
families with health insurance fear that they
may lose it, firms with household names
seek ways to extricate themselves from 
providing health insurance for their 
employees, and the new Deficit Reduction
Act of 2005 permits doctors and hospitals
to deny services to Medicaid recipients who
cannot meet required co-payments and
deductibles. In an early 2006 article, The
Economist asserts that the “world’s biggest
and most expensive health-care system is
beginning to fall apart;” it also suggests 
that health reform is “one of the most 
complicated challenges facing America’s
economy.”
2 Why has health care become a
major challenge to the U.S. economy and to
economic policy makers? At least three
developments explain the growing impor-
tanceof health reform as an economic issue.
Clearly, the health care sector is now very
large and touches most aspects of the U.S.
and New England economies. In 2004,
spending on medical care amounted to 16
percent of U.S. nominal GDP—more than
consumers spent on food, clothing, and
energy in total and about equal to all busi-
ness investment in plant and equipment.
Further, health care’s share of non-farm
employment is now 9 percent and grow-
ing—that’s roughly akin to manufacturing’s
shrinking share of the workforce. In New
England, health care looms even larger,
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accounting for almost 12 percent of regional
employment. In the future, this sector is almost
certain to absorb an even greater share of GDP,
for, as OECD data suggest, as national incomes
rise, countries generally choose to spend a grow-
ing share of their income on health and health care
(Figure 1).
3
With health care spending projected to reach 22
percent of GDP by 2025,
4 it becomes increasingly
important that U.S. policy makers be able to
measure health care output, prices, and productiv-
ity accurately—no easy task. Currently, the most
familiar measure of health care costs is probably
the medical care CPI, which measures inflation in
consumers’ out-of-pocket costs for medical care, a
fraction of total health care spending. For a vari-
ety of reasons, the medical CPI has been increas-
ing a lot faster than the core CPI, helping to boost
broad measures of inflation and labor costs as
well. In addition, rapid medical cost inflation has
contributed to a widespread impression that pro-
ductivity in the U.S. health care sector may be
rather low. By contrast, a growing body of recent
research provides evidence of significant produc-
tivity gains in health care for patients suffering
from specific widespread problems like cataracts,
depression, and heart attacks. But do these find-
ings apply to the whole health care sector? Indeed,
international data indicate that the United States
spends far more per person on health care than
would be expected given its per capita income
(Figure 1),
5 while data on expenditures and out-
comes suggest that this country’s extra spending
may not be particularly productive (Figure 2).
6
A second reason for economists’ concern about
the health care system reflects its possibly 
distorting effect on the operation of the U.S. labor
market. Compared with other OECD countries,
employment-based insurance plays an unusually
large role in the U.S. health care system, where it
finances about 40 percent of U.S. health care
spending. But of course, not all employers offer
health insurance. And over the decade to 2003,
the share of private-sector workers actually 
participating in employer-provided medical plans
fell from 63 percent to 45 percent, in part reflecting
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workforce shifts from full- to part-time and union
tonon-union status. In addition, a smaller share of
workers who are offered health insurance now
choose to take it—most likely because a growing
fraction of employers are requiring workers elect-
ing this benefit to contribute more toward its
cost.
7 Another factor may be the increase in 
two-worker households.
Are these employment-based financing arrange-
ments affecting the supply or demand for labor in
this country? Are they influencing the structure of
employment, encouraging a shift toward the use
of temporary or contract labor? Does our health
care system distort our labor market and reduce
its flexibility? The answers to these questions 
concern policy makers.
Turning, finally, to fiscal issues, the tax-financed
share of health care is estimated to have reached
about 60 percent in 1999,
8 up from 55 percent in
1990 and a higher percentage than most people
expect. The large and rising share of publicly fund-
ed health care puts pressure on federal and state
budgets, limiting those governments’ non-health
policy options. According to the Social Security and
Medicare Trustees Report of 2005, total Medicare
expenditures will rise as a share of GDP from 2.6
percent currently to 13.6 percent in 2079. If so,
Medicare expenditures will exceed those for Social
Security in 2024 and represent twice the cost of
Social Security in 2079 (Figure 3). Moreover, at the
state level, many governments have taken steps to
expand the scope of Medicaid in order to extend
health insurance coverage to particularly vulnera-
ble groups, such as children. This trend has placed
an increased burden on state budgets (Figure 4).
How the nation and individual states address these
imbalances—through increased taxes, reduced
benefits, or increased borrowing—will affect U.S.
interest rates, private savings and investment, and
international capital flows.
Prompted by its interest in these issues, the
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston brought together
economists, health practitioners, and policy 
makers to examine the topic “Wanting It All: The
Challenge of Reforming the U.S. Health Care
System” in June 2005. This essay summarizes the
themes and the consensus-based prescriptions for
action that emerged from that conference.
(Please see the box on page 14 for a list of 
conference presenters.) 
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Rising health care costs are the result of advancements in
medical technology, not population growth or aging.11
Defining the Health 
Care Challenge—
“The Problem with 
No Obvious Solution”
This country’s health care goals include broad,
secure access to “appropriate,” high-quality care
based on active discovery and innovation at an
“acceptable” (aye, there’s the rub) cost to the ulti-
mate payer. All industrial countries share these
goals, although, as Kieke Okma points out, not
necessarily the weights they assign to them. For
example, Europeans tend to put more weight on
access to care than do Americans, who seem to
put consumer choice at the top of the list and
access toward the bottom. But in the end, in
“wanting it all,” every country struggles with the
inherent conflicts between these goals. In particu-
lar, since all countries adopt new medical 
technologies as they become available, all strug-
gle to contain the rapid pace of growth in health
care costs. And most could put more emphasis on
prevention and achieving good health.
9
These inherent conflicts reflect the essential value
of health care to many patients/consumers. They
also reflect, as William Nordhaus points out, 
society’s embrace of “specific egalitarianism”
10 as
well as society’s reluctance to ration health care
by price or even by regulation. Obviously, these 
attitudes do not accord well with an equally 
widespread lack of political will to pay for other
people’s health care. And these inconsistencies
are only exacerbated by information asymme-
tries; by the absence of cost consciousness among
consumers; and by limited competition among
providers and health plans. Finally, Richard Frank
and others raise a host of behavioral issues that
further compound the situation, issues that
include patient-doctor inertia, rules of thumb,
excessive optimism, and myopia regarding the
need to save for medical emergencies. These
inherent conflicts lead David Cutler to call health
reform “a hard problem;” Nordhaus to call it “a
very hard problem;” and Henry Aaron to call it
“the problem that won’t go away.” 
Measuring and Valuing
Health Care
David Cutler and William Nordhaus both 
demonstrate that improvements in public health
and medical care have added enormously to our
standard of living over the past one hundred
years. Nordhaus even concludes that the value of
the gains stemming from improvements in health
status equals the value of all other gains in 
consumption over the past quarter century. Not
surprisingly, then, as physicians have become
more effective and societies have grown wealthi-
er, people have chosen to spend a higher share of
their incomes on health care—they value what
doctors can do for them. In addition, as Cutler
points out, health care turns out to be highly price
elastic; properly measured, some quality-adjusted
health care prices are actually falling, and people
spend more in response. Further, as Cutler also
demonstrates, cost-benefit analysis of specific
interventions, like treatment for heart attack,
finds that such interventions are clearly “worth”
their cost, based on common assumptions regard-
ing the economic value of the additional years of
life resulting from the intervention. For example,
$30,000 in expenditures for a 45-year-old cardiac
patient leads on average to three years’ longer
life. Since three years’ longer life has a discounted
present value of $120,000 by common estimates,
the return on the investment is 4 to 1. 
But, as Cutler also notes, the fact that much of
today’s health care is highly valued (particularly
by individual doctors, patients, and their families
confronting specific medical crises) does not 
necessarily make it affordable (particularly to tax-
payers, to whom hypothetical patients are mere
statistics). Nor does this high valuation mean that
all health care dollars are well spent. Cutler 
suggests that at least 20 percent of health care
spending is wasted, while Wennberg, Skinner, and
Fisher (who find that Medicare spends half as
much per patient in Minnesota as in Miami with
equally good results) conclude that the waste in
Medicare is closer to 30 percent.
11 But  under
spending also contributes to the inefficiency of
the U.S. health care system. For example, too little12
is spent on prevention and chronic disease man-
agement—for the insured as well as for the 
uninsured. And the system often does a poor job
of coordinating different aspects or phases of a
patient’s care, such as the transition from acute to
chronic care, or the transfer of records from one





Prescriptions for reducing the inefficiencies plaguing
the U.S. health care system include making con-
sumers more sensitive to the costs of their medical
care, making providers more responsible for health
care outcomes, and encouraging better use of infor-
mation and communication technology throughout
the health care system. To start with consumer
awareness, most analysts, including those at the
Boston Fed conference, agree that the tax subsidy
for employer-provided health insurance, which cur-
rently cuts federal tax revenues by about $200 bil-
lion per year,
12 reduces cost consciousness and
should be eliminated for the non-poor.
13
Asecond, newly popular approach to encouraging
patients to be more cost conscious involves
increasing the availability of low-cost insurance
with high deductibles and high co-payments,
combined with Health Savings Accounts (HSAs)
or Health Reimbursement Arrangements.
Together, these elements make up “consumer
driven health care” (CDHC), which, to be effective,
requires that health care cost information be
widely available and of significance to patients
making health care decisions. While several 
conference participants, including Alain Enthoven,
Mark Pauly, Gene Steuerle, and Stuart Altman,
see some merit in aspects of consumer driven
health care,
14 many attendees are concerned that
CDHC will encourage underutilization of preven-
tive care, particularly by low-income individuals
unable to afford the high co-payments and
deductibles. And such concerns appear to be 
warranted, judging by a recent study that finds
that, for reasons of cost, 35 percent of individuals
with CDHC plans skipped or delayed health care, 
compared with 17 percent of persons with 
comprehensive health plans.
15 In addition, confer-
ence participants including Richard Frank, Robert
Galvin, Sherry Glied, and David Meltzer point to
the general absence of the information regarding
health care costs that would be required to make
CDHC work; the reluctance of doctors and
patients to discuss matters of cost; the impor-
tance of advice from family and friends; and the
prominence of inertia in determining patient
choice of health care providers.
As for motivating providers to improve efficiency,
many conference participants see considerable
promise in “pay for performance,” a reimburse-
ment system that rewards providers for good 
outcomes and for following prescribed protocols
for vaccinations and other preventive care—
that is, for doing what they ought to do. A smaller
group, led by Alain Enthoven, advocates combin-
ing “pay for performance” with support for 
integrated delivery systems likeKaiser Permanente
in California and Harvard Vanguard in
Massachusetts. Such systems are built around a
core multi-specialty group practice that has a sig-
nificant share of its revenues based on per capita
pre-payment. Further,members of the practiceare
encouraged to adhere to up-to-date clinical stan-
dards developed by the team.
16 According to
Enthoven, integrated delivery systems, also
known as “delivery system HMOs,” should be
sharply distinguished from “carrier HMOs,” 
rather inclusive networks of unaffiliated physi-
cians generally working under fee-for-service
arrangements. In choosing to receive care from an
integrated delivery system, an individual is opting
to hire a general contractor, to use a Karen Davis
metaphor, rather than to deal with the plumber,
the roofer, the painter, and the candlestick maker
individually. Obviously, the individual’s care is 
likely to be better coordinated, and, between 
capitation and patient inertia regarding choice 
of doctor, the system’s managers have consider-
able incentive to provide good preventive care 
and disease management, using non-physician
providers whenever appropriate. 13
Many conference participants see considerable 
promise in “pay for performance,” a reimbursement 
system that rewards providers for good outcomes 
and for following prescribed protocols.But while Kaiser, Mayo, and Harvard Vanguard
are widely acknowledged to provide great care,
integrated delivery systems are not popular out-
side of California and, to a lesser extent,
Massachusetts and Connecticut. Why not?
Chernew and Glied suggest that people fear pre-
committing to a narrow set of doctors before
knowing what their medical needs may be and
that such systems may require too much travel.
But in their eyes, the major deterrent is likely to be
resistance to switching doctors, a resistance that
has fostered the spread of preferred provider
organizations (PPOs) and other almost universal-
ly inclusive networks of independent providers.
Richard Frank and David Meltzer also raise some
behavioral concerns about the efficacy of practice
guidelines and “pay for performance,” noting that
physicians tend to be over optimistic, over confi-
dent, and reluctant (or
uncertain how) to change
their ways. In the end, while
most observers view inte-
grated delivery systems and
“pay for performance” as
likely to improve the efficien-
cy of the U.S. health care
system, no one claims that
these options will keep
health care expenditures
from rising as a share of
income. And, as Chernew
points out, the more efficient
the system becomes, the
harder it is to avoid the
painful trade-offs between
quality and access.   
Turning to technology, while
almost everyone agrees that
advancing medical technolo-
gy is the primary driver of ris-
ing health care costs—“it’s
the technology, stupid,” to
quote Mark Pauly—many
conference participants re-
main convinced that better
use of information and 
communications technology
holds great promise for improving the efficiency of
the complex, disjointed U.S. health care system.
According to Jim Mongan and David Brailer, for
example, electronic medical records will do far
more than cut paperwork and reduce error; more
important, they will also drive medicine toward
evidence-based practice. Galvin, Brailer, Davis,
and Mongan all see huge potential in a national
effort to identify and spread best practices and 
to develop and publicize quality measures.
Nevertheless, Pauly and others suspect that even
with better consumer and provider incentives and
improved information and communications tech-
nology, U.S. policy makers will likely need to find a
graceful, politically acceptable way to slow the
adoption of new or unneeded medical technology
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This essay provides a summary of the views presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston’s 50th Economic Conference: “Wanting It All: The Challenge of Reforming the
U.S. Health Care System, ” which was held in June of 2005. We thank all of the 
presenters, who are listed below, for contributing to the success of the conference.
The conference agenda and the presenters’ papers 
and biographies can be found at 
www.bos.frb.org/economic/conf/conf50/index.htm15
Employer-Based Health
Insurance: Pros and Cons
In the United States, members of the middle class
generally obtain their health insurance through
employer-provided health benefits. Although
employment-based insurance crops up in many
countries, this arrangement has played an unusu-
ally dominant role in the United States. In the
1940s, U.S. employers constrained by wartime
price controls were encouraged to compete for
workers by offering tax-subsidized health benefits
in place of higher wages; today, employer-
provided benefits are the primary source of health
insurance for the non-elderly. These employment-
based arrangements cover 63 percent of the 
non-elderly population; by contrast, public 
programs like Medicaid and Medicare cover just
17 percent (Figure 5). As Brigitte Madrian points
out, the result is a highly fragmented system
where thousands of employers define the health
insurance options available to their workers and
where even Medicaid comprises 50 different state
programs. Does this employment-based system
serve the country well?
Many conference participants, including Alain
Enthoven and Henry Farber, answer no. They
describe the system as “hopelessly flawed” and a
“terrible idea” because it leaves millions of people
without access to affordable health care, bears
most heavily on low-wage workers, and makes
the U.S. labor market less flexible and dynamic. To
start with this last point, just 60 percent of U.S.
employers offer health insurance to any part of
their workforce, and that share has been declining
in recent years as health benefits have grown
more costly. As a result, Madrian and others find
that worker demand for affordable health insur-
ance and employer efforts to minimize the cost of
offering this benefit distort labor market deci-
sions, reducing labor market flexibility and worker
productivity. On the supply side, the availability 
of affordable health insurance significantly
affects individual decisions regarding where to
work or whether to work at all. Further, because
employer-provided health insurance is not
portable, insurance contracts exclude pre-existing 
conditions, and people hate changing their 
doctors, the employer-based system tends to 
discourage labor mobility, producing a phenome-
non known as “job lock”
17—even “wedlock” on
occasion. More importantly perhaps, on the
demand side, employers face an incentive to sub-
stitute part-time or temporary workers for 
full-time workers in order to avoid health insur-
ance costs. Similarly, firms may ask existing 
full-time staff, who already have health benefits,
to work more hours instead of hiring more 
full-time workers, who will add to insurance costs.
Given the evidence that workers do in fact pay for
their health benefits through lower wages as 
economic theory would suggest, such employer
efforts to minimize health insurance costs may
seem puzzling. But it is not clear that the 
wage-benefit trade-off is either immediate or
one-for-one. For example, as Joseph Newhouse
points out, minimum wage laws limit employers’
practical ability to shift big increases in insurance
costs to low-wage workers. Nor is it easy to ask
current workers to pay for big increases in the cost
of retiree insurance, especially since, as Farber
notes, mature firms like GM now have more pen-
sioners than active employees.
Figure 5
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Source: Employee Benefit Research Institute, 2003.
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Just 60 percent of U.S. employers offer health insurance to any
part of their workforce, and that share has been declining in
recent years as health benefits have grown more costly.17
In addition, Enthoven, Farber, and Bob Galvin
agree that many employers are ill-equipped to
purchase health insurance for their workers. 
Few small employers have a good understanding
of health care issues, and employer/worker 
interests may not coincide. For example, while
employers clearly have an interest in attracting
healthy, productive workers, management’s 
interest in their workers’ long-term health may
have declined in recent years as average job
tenures have fallen and lifetime employment has
virtually disappeared. 
On the other hand, as Altman, Pauly, and Galvin
argue, large firms with good benefits departments
deliver very responsive health care to their work-
ers in a very efficient manner. These firms have
taken the lead in promoting fitness and wellness
programs, in encouraging “pay for performance,”
and in developing accessible information on
provider quality and costs. Further, as Galvin
emphasizes, in an employer-linked system, deci-
sions regarding the use of new technologies are
market-based. Without these market signals, how
would the nation determine how much to invest in
desirable medical innovation? Would a single-
payer system with a “politically acceptable” 
global budget do as well? 
Fiscal Pressures
Even now, the federal government’s existing
responsibilities for health care are projected to
create extraordinary fiscal—and political—pres-
sures in the decades ahead. Although political and
media attention has so far focused primarily on
the need to address the Social Security “crisis”
approaching with the retirement of the Baby
Boom generation, the government’s future com-
mitments under the Medicare and Medicaid 
programs loom considerably larger, as Henry
Aaron, Stuart Altman, and others emphasize. 
To draw the comparison more precisely, the 
baseline, or intermediate, estimate from the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that
federal spending for Social Security will rise from
4.2 percent of GDP in 2005 to 6.4 percent in 2050.
By contrast, in the intermediate case, federal
spending for Medicare and Medicaid, also 4.2 
percent of GDP today, is projected to reach 12.6
percent of national output by mid century (Figure
6). Unfortunately, however, the CBO’s intermedi-
ate projection assumes, as do the Medicare
trustees, that Medicare and Medicaid spending
per enrollee will exceed per capita GDP growth by
just 1 percentage point per year—an unrealistic
assumption judging by U.S. history and by 
international trends. As the CBO points out,
Medicare-Medicaid spending (and health care
spending more generally) has in fact grown an
average of 2.5 percentage points faster than 
per capita GDP since 1970. Again, this gap 
largely reflects technological improvements, not
population aging. If these trends continue,
Medicare-Medicaid spending will account for 22
percent of GDP in 2050—almost 18 percentage
points more than currently.
18 Further, as Henry
Aaron points out, because the private and public
sectors share responsibility for health care 
spending in this country, at current trends, health
care will claim about half of all U.S. income and all
of the increase in economic output by mid 
century. Valuable as health care is, is this 
outcome realistic?  
Projections of 
Federal Spending 


























Source: Congressional Budget Office, Long-Term Budget Outlook, 2005.18
Confronted with these prospects, what will the
U.S. electorate do? Among the alternatives Aaron
posits, one course might be to continue, by
default, along the current path and simply pay the
bill. This option would allow increasing our non-
health standard of living for a while, but, as health
care came to claim all of the growth in economic
output and then more, the situation could turn
unsustainable—if the share of economic output
devoted to education, research and development,
and crucial infrastructure began to shrink, eco-
nomic growth itself would slow. As an obvious,
desirable alternative, U.S. policy makers could
redouble their efforts to make the health care 
system more efficient, but, as already discussed, a
better targeted system requires more spending in
some areas and less in others, making the net 
savings likely not very large. To curb Medicare
spending specifically, Congress could pass restric-
tive legislation, increasing the Medicare eligibility
age to 67, for example. While this change might
encourage people to work longer, it would not
save much money because the young elderly 
are reasonably healthy. Congress could also
increase Medicare deductibles, co-payments, and
premiums,
19 but, as Aaron notes, these changes
would simply shift costs to the private sector or
reduce the elderly population’s access to medical
care. While Medicare administrators could, for
example, conceivably slow the pace at which they
approve Medicare coverage for new technologies,
the Boomer Generation, as Stuart Altman
observes, has always been a demanding, spending
lot, even in their 30s and 40s; he doubts they will
permit substandard care for the elderly (and
poor?) to reemerge as they age.  
How then is the nation going to pay this medical
bill? Assuming that the current gap between the
growth in health care costs and the growth in GDP
continues, meeting current Medicare-Medicaid
commitments, Henry Aaron calculates, will
require doubling payroll and income tax revenues
as a share of GDP by 2040. Even slowing the
increase in health care spending to 1 percentage
point above per capita GDP growth would mean
raising tax revenues by 6 percent of GDP by 2040.
But, according to Stuart Altman, the United
States is a “tax-phobic” nation with an Eleventh
Commandment proscribing tax rates above 18
percent to 19 percent of GDP, while Joseph
Newhouse notes that U.S. tax revenues have
exceeded 20 percent of GDP on just one occasion
in the post World War II era. 
The options are limited—to us collectively as a
society or individually. The more we choose to
emphasize individual responsibility, the more cost
conscious the system will be, but the more access
for the poor and the seriously ill becomes problem-
atic. In the end, U.S. voters will have to decide
what they are willing to spend for other people’s
health care, for, as Alan Weil points out, while 
people are willing to spend a lot for their own
health care, it is less clear what they are willing to
spend on the care of others. In Henry Aaron’s view,
resolving these issues will impose major stresses
on the democratic polity of this country in 
coming decades. 
Wanting It All, 
Getting Much of It—
Areas of Agreement
Most of the health care experts attending the
Boston Fed’s June 2005 conference appear to
agree with Karen Davis, whose remarks, entitled
“Getting It All,” argue that we actually do know
how to achieve much of what we want for the U.S.
health care system, including even broader access,
and we should “just go ahead and do it.” Within
this group of analysts, all tend to cite the same list
of ways to increase the efficiency of the U.S.
health care system and move it toward the 
production possibility frontier. In their view, good
steps to take include encouraging increased use of
“pay for performance” and integrated delivery
systems—with ongoing efforts to understand the
behavioral issues that might undermine their
spread and effectiveness. They also advocate
added emphasis on primary and preventive care
and disease management as well as broader use
of communications and information technology
to identify what works. Less obviously, perhaps,
most experts also support renewed efforts to
improveconsumer cost consciousness byeliminating19
If current spending trends continue, health care will claim half of U.S.
income and all of the increase in output by 2050, squeezing other
important areas such as education and infrastructure.20
The last several years have seen private
health insurance premiums rise and the
ranks of the uninsured swell, while state
budgets have come under increased 
fiscal pressure, limiting expansion or
compelling cuts in existing programs.
Nevertheless, some states have man-
aged to summon the political will to
implement health reform strategies that
stretch health care dollars by using a 
portion of state money to leverage 
private, federal, and additional state
funds in order to expand coverage and
improve program efficiency. Initiatives of
the New England states include using
federal Medicaid waivers and State
Children’s Health Insurance Program
(SCHIP) waivers to expand coverage to
nontraditional beneficiaries; enacting
“pay or play” laws; and creating group
purchasing arrangements.1 The pro-
grams of three states are explored here.
Rhode Island. In 1993, Rhode Island
applied for a Medicaid 1115 waiver, 
permitting it to conduct a demonstration
project, RIte Care. RIte Care provides
comprehensive coverage to families on
the Family Independence Program 
(formerly AFDC) and eligible uninsured
pregnant women, parents of children 18
and younger, and children up to age 19.
The program experienced a higher-than-
expected take-up rate, resulting in fiscal
pressure. In 2001, in an effort to reduce
the cost burden without cutting eligibili-
ty, the state obtained a SCHIP 1115 
waiver, converting the parents of 
children eligible for public health cover-
age from Medicaid to SCHIP and, in so
doing, receiving a higher SCHIP federal
match for these enrollees. Additionally,
Rhode Island created RIte Share, a pre-
mium-assistance program for RIte Care
eligible families with access to approved
employer-sponsored health insurance.
RIte Share leverages employer dollars,
resulting in savings to the state for every
family enrolled in this plan instead of RIte
Care, which has a full public subsidy.
Under RIte Share, the state pays the
employee’s share of work-based insur-
ance premiums (families above 150 
percent of the federal poverty level make
contributions according to a sliding
scale), the employee’s co-payments, and
wraparound coverage for Medicaid benefits
not in the employer’s health plan. 
The results of RIte Share are encouraging.
The Rhode Island Department of Human
Services (DHS) has determined that 
subsidizing a family in RIte Share plus
providing wraparound services costs the
state slightly more than half the expense
of covering the family through the RIte
Care managed-care plan. Thus far, DHS
has transitioned 4 percent of the RIte
Care population into RIte Share, 
resulting in a savings of about 2 percent
of the program. 
Maine. Maine’s Dirigo Health Plan, 
created in 2003, aims to increase access
to affordable health insurance coverage,
slowthe growth of health care costs, and
improve the quality of care. One compo-
nent, DirigoChoice, offers affordable
health care insurance, through private
carriers, to small-business employees,
the self-employed, individuals without
access to employer coverage, and
dependents of these eligibles. The pro-
gram pools employee, employer, state,
and federal funding sources to be able to
deliver reduced-cost health insurance. 
To increase coverage for its low-income
population, Maine obtained a federal
waiver to extend its state Medicaid 
program, MaineCare, to parents with
incomes under 200 percent of the feder-
al poverty level and to childless adults
with incomes up to 125 percent of the
federal poverty level. For working 
persons who areineligible for MaineCare
and whose income is below 300 percent
of the federal poverty level, the state pro-
vides assistance in purchasing DirigoChoice
coverage on a sliding scale. Both the slid-
ing scale and the MaineCare expansion
are financed by redirecting a portion of
the disproportionate share hospital
(DSH) allocation.
In an effort to contain health care costs,
the Governor’s Office of Health Policy
and Finance now sets explicit targets for
quality, cost, and access to health care,
and establishes a budget to assist in
resource allocation. In a move to
increase transparency, Maine requires
that average charges and payments
accepted for commonly performed pro-
cedures be posted at each provider site.
In addition, Maine has expanded the
reach of its certificate-of-need program
to cover functions and expenditures
regardless of the site of care and has put
voluntary limits on the growth of 
insurance premiums and health care
costs. Mandatory provider use of health
care information technology has also
been proposed. 
In its first nine months, DirigoChoice 
has enrolled over 7,000 residents and
achieved $43.7 million in savings for the
Maine health care system. However,
enrollment has been lower than expect-
ed, and a survey of enrollees finds that
only one in four was uninsured at the
time they purchased state-subsidized
insurance. The majority of DirigoChoice
enrollees simply switched from other 
private insurance. 
Massachusetts. In Massachusetts, April
2006 saw a bipartisan bill break political
gridlock and extend health care coverage
to the state’s 500,000 uninsured. The
new legislation combines the individual
mandate championed by conserva-
tives—that all individuals should have
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health insurance—with liberal measures
such as large subsidies to help low-
income individuals buy insurance and a
proposed employer mandate—that all
firms with 11 or more employees should
provide health insurance. Under the 
legislation, the approximately 200,000
uninsured Bay State residents who can
afford to buy health insurance will be
required to purchase it or face tax penal-
ties. To help these individuals acquire
coverage, the state will create a group
purchasing arrangement, allowing indi-
viduals and small businesses to buy
insurance as one entity. 
The state’s additional uninsured 
comprise two groups: (1) 100,000
individuals who qualify for Medicaid but
are not signed up for it, and (2) 200,000
individuals who do not qualify for
Medicaid but are too poor to buy health
insurance on their own. Those who 
qualify for Medicaid will be enrolled in it,
with the cost split between the state and
the federal government. For the second
group, those earning up to 100 percent
of the federal poverty level will receive
coverage at no cost, while those with
incomes between 100 percent and 300
percent of the federal poverty level will
pay a portion of the premium, based on a
sliding scale. Funding for both groups
will come from (1) state funds set aside
to pay hospitals and other providers for
treating the uninsured, as well as (2)
$385 million pledged by the federal gov-
ernment if the state can show it is on a
path to reducing its number of unin-
sured. Funding would also come from
the proposed “pay or play” provision of
the new law, which requires all employ-
ers with 11 or more employees to provide
health care insurance or to pay an annu-
al penalty of $295 per worker. 
Rhode Island, Maine, and Massachusetts
have implemented innovative policies to
address the rising ranks of the uninsured
and control health care costs. While
none of these plans to date has provided
a solution to all of the challenges the
health care system currently faces, they
do offer innovative ideas and reinvigo-
rate the ongoing national debate. 
– Teresa M. Foy 
1. The strategies employed by states include 
reinsurance, high risk pools, and limited benefit 
plans. This section only covers a subset of the 
New England states’ utilization of federal 
waivers and other state health system reforms.22
While Americans are willing to spend a lot for their own health care, 
it is less clear what they are willing to spend on the care of others.23
tax subsidies for employer-provided health bene-
fits and, to a lesser extent, by additional 
provision of consumer-directed health plans.
While  the conference attendees admit that 
individually these measures will not save a lot of
money, 10 percent here and 15 percent there
begins to add up. 
Importantly, moreover, these experts broadly
agree that insuring the uninsured would require
relatively modest amounts of additional money:
less than $100 billion a year—less than 5 per-
cent of current health care spending, roughly
the money returned to taxpayer pockets by
recent below-average tax rates,
20 and money
that could prevent 18,000 premature deaths a
year among the under 65’s, according to Jim
Mongan. On net, the extra cost is likely to be
modest because the uninsured already get some
medical care, often in emergency settings, and
because providing preventive care and disease
management for these people would actually be
more efficient over time. 
Thus, once again, these analysts concur, the
nation should “just do it”
21 and move to provide
universal coverage without waiting until we figure
out how to control health care costs, for, as Judy
Feder argues, the uninsured minority have been
held hostage to our unwillingness to slow the
growth of health care spending for the well-
insured majority for 50 years. Henry Aaron 
concludes that universal coverage may be a 
necessary precondition for controlling overall
health care spending; others argue that universal
coverage must come first because cost control
without coverage would mean squeezing 
low-income people out of the system.  
As a result, the conference participants gener-
ally advocate using any cost savings reaped
from the reforms discussed above to fund
broader health insurance coverage. As one
example, Alan Weil suggests making employer
payments for health insurance benefits taxable





Beyond the large areas of agreement just
reviewed, two issues—the role of employer-based
insurance and the most appropriate way to con-
trol the growth of U.S. health care costs—defy
consensus. To start with the first issue, conference
attendees clearly have differing views on the mer-
its of this country’s employment-based system,
with some viewing it as a disaster and others find-
ing it an efficient organizing mechanism and a
progressive force. But whatever their views on its
merits, many analysts, including Altman,
Newhouse, and Feder, are convinced that the
employment-based system is crumbling badly,
because, as Bob Galvin notes, many employers
are seeking to escape from providing health insurance.
That explains why employers are responding to
consumer driven health care (CDHC) with enthu-
siasm; they really do believe that consumers must
become more cost conscious, but they are also
looking for an exit strategy. Thus, Bob Galvin pre-
dicts, 20 to 30 percent of all workers will soon
have health savings accounts (HSAs), which will
drive out traditional health insurance just as
401Ks drove out defined benefit pensions.
Employers don’t want to abandon their employ-
ees, but CDHC provides them with an acceptable
way out. 
Unfortunately, however, CDHC and HSAs may
not work well for low-income workers, who may
opt to buy low-premium insurance but be unable
to pay the required deductibles, co-payments, and
other large, but less than “catastrophic”
22 expens-
es, or who may opt out of buying health insurance
altogether. These people will swell the ranks of the
uninsured or the Medicaid population because, as
noted above, manystates aremaking imaginative
efforts to redefine their Medicaid programs to let
them cover nontraditional beneficiaries. (See the
box on page 20 for a description of recent state
initiatives in New England.) 24
But, as Alan Weil points out, the fiscal stresses at
the state level are becoming enormous. As a
result, the U.S. Congress passed the Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005 to give the states new lee-
way to charge premiums and raise co-payments
for Medicaid benefits. Further, this law, for the first
time ever, allows states to end Medicaid coverage
for people who fail to pay these new premiums
and permits doctors, hospitals, and pharmacies to
deny services to Medicaid recipients who cannot
make required co-payments. To judge from 
current trends, the end result of employer efforts
to avoid health care costs may be a de facto 
single-payer (or largely single-payer) system, but
one in which impoverished people can be denied
needed health care. For analysts who favor
employer-based insurance, the only way to stem
this tide may be to get “pay or play” laws that
require all employers to provide health benefits or
to contribute to a state insurancepool back on the
list of live policy options.
The conference attendees also fail to reach con-
sensus on further ways to curb the growth in
health care costs beyond those that would posi-
tion the U.S. health care system to operate at
maximum efficiency, although most agree that
such efforts would have to include limiting insured
middle-class access to valuable new technologies.
At one extreme, a de facto single-payer system
would require a global budget. Would such a
budget fund optimum investment in new tech-
nologies, Bob Galvin wonders, or would a market-
based system do a better job? Also envisioning an
ongoing role for private insurance, Mark Pauly
suggests that insurers develop low-cost insurance
with limited access to new interventions and 
technology and tout these products as “prudent
care” in order to slow the adoption of possibly
dangerous (and clearly expensive) new technolo-
gies. By contrast, Gene Steuerle would focus on
finding ways to encourage cost-saving rather than
cost-increasing new technologies. But privately
funded health care would set the standards for all,
because, as Jim Mongan points out, while we find
price rationing acceptable in the case of hotels, we
naturally find it far less palatable in the case of
health care. Still, non-price rationing through 
government or private-payer limits leads to unac-
ceptable queues and shortages. In the same vein,
Nordhaus sees some attractions in Oregon’s sys-
tem of ranking medical interventions by using
cost-benefit analysis; and good sense would sug-
gest then drawing a line where the health care
budget is totally absorbed. Although the Oregon
system has many problems and critics, and, after
all, only applies to Medicaid patients, Nordhaus
argues that it is logical and flexible, responding to
both technological and fiscal developments.   
In the end, conference participants conclude, the
major challenge posed by the U.S. health care sys-
tem remains summoning the political will to make
these difficult allocational decisions in a responsi-
ble and equitable way. Failure to meet this chal-
lenge would have serious consequences for the
U.S. macro economy and polity—as well as for
every individual family’s well-being.  
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